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THE CONTROL OF THE TITLE TO PROPERTY BY TIE HOLDER OF AN
OPTION.
The Supreme Court of Kansas in the recent case of Khrut v.
Phares, reported in the io3 Pac. Rep. 117, compelled the agent
of certain option holders to account to the principals for a sale
which he had made, they having released their option because of
the fraudulent representations of the agent. The agent con-
tended that as the plaintiffs had no title in the land by virtue of
the option, an accounting need not be made to them. But it was
held that while an option holder does not before acceptance
acquire any estate or interest in the land, he has such control of
the title that by specific performance he may compel a convey-
ance and so may make a lawful sale of the land to a third party.
It is frequently desirable in the making of contracts for the
sale of property that the vendee should have time for considera-
tion before entering into the transaction. The option is the
means by which this may be accomplished. The holder of the
option acquires a right by contract to accept or reject a present
offer for the sale of land within a certain time.
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The confusion which has resulted from the exercise of options
has been caused by the failure of courts to distinguish between an
offer to sell, and a contract independent of such offer-the con-
tract to leave the offer open for a period named. There are two
elements in optional contracts; an offer to sell, which must be
accepted to become binding; and a contract to leave the offer
open for a specified period. The former is an executory con-
tract, the latter executed. The elements are distinctly indepen-
dent.
In an agreement for a lease containing an option to sell a
tenant the fee within two years, the lease was forfeited for breach
of a covenant, but the court held that the option to sell was a
separate agreement and would be specifically enforced although
the lease had been forfeited. Green v. Low, 22 Beav. 625; Alli-
son v. Cocke's Exc., 1O6 Ky. 763.
The giver of the option does not sell his land, or agree to sell
it. But he does sell something, viz: the right or privilege to buy
at the option of the other party. The owner parts with his right
to dispose of the property except to the option holder, for a
specified time. The option holder purchases the right to elect
to buy within that time. Ide v. Leisor, IO Mont. 5; Fulenwider
v. Rowan, 136 Ala. 387.
The old English case of Cooke v. Oxley, 3 T. R. 653, holding
that an offer which was intended to be accepted at a future time
could not be turned into a binding contract although there was
nothing to show that notice of revocation of the offer had been
communicated to the promisee before acceptance by the latter,
seems to be responsible for the conflict which has grown out of
the making of optional contracts. In the case of Bell v. Howard,
9 Mod. 302, the English Court of Chancery would not grant
specific performance, because of the want of mutuality, of an
optional contract to purchase even though it had been given for
a valuable consideration. But Cooke v. Oxley has been generally
overruled in the United States and in England. Ry. Co. v. Bart-
lett, 3 Cush. (Mass.) 225; Cummins v. Beavers, 103 Va. 230. In
fact, it is now supposed that the case was improperly reported.
And Bell v. Howard, supra, is clearly a minority rule at the pres-
ent time. However, in Jenkins v. Locke, 3 App. D. C. 485, the
court followed that case.
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The supposed want of mutuality in optional contracts is, of
course, the main point of difference. Might the giver of the
option at any time defeat the right of the holder to accept the
offer? Where there is a valuable consideration given for the
option, the option is irrevocable within the time specified. "A
covenant in a lease giving to the lessee a right or option to pur-
chase the premises leased at any time during the term is in the
nature of a continuing offer to sell. The offer thus made, if
under seal, is regarded as made upon sufficient consideration, and
therefore one from which the lessor is not at liberty to recede."
Willard V. Tayloe, 8 Wall. 557; Moses v. McClain, 82 Ala. 370;
Ross v. Parks, 93 Ala. 153; Johnston v. Trippe, 33 Fed. 530;
O'Brien v. Boland, 166 Mass. 481; Borel v. Mead, 3 New Mex.
Rep. 84; Bishop on Contracts, Sect. 325; 1 Addison on Contracts,
Sect. 20. But see Rust v. Conrad, 47 Mich. 449, contra.
Where there has been no consideration given for the option,
the giver thereof may revoke the same before acceptance at any
time he sees fit. For until the offer is accepted, there can be no
contract as there is nothing by which the proposer can be bound.
Unless both are bound so that an action can be maintained
against one or the other, neither will be bound. Weaver v. Burr,
31 W. Va. 736; Ry. v. Bartlett, supra; Cummins v. Beavers.
supra; Ide v. Leiser, IO Mont. 5.
It is proper to note, however, that in studying the reported
cases it is found that there has been in all of them an acceptance
of the offer contained in the option, thus completing the con-
tract. But the language of the courts is broad enough to imply
that even where the offer was formally withdrawn before the
expiration of the option which was supported by a valuable con-
sideration, they would nevertheless decree specific performance.
After the option has been exercised and the conditions per-
formed it is too late for the grantor to recede from his offer.
Perkins v. Hadsell, 50 Ill. 216; Corson v. Mulvany, 49 Pa. ioo;
Cheney v. Cook, 7 Wis. 413; Wilcox v. Cline, 70 Mich. 517. On
acceptance, the contract becomes absolute and mutual in its
obligations and may be specifically enforced. Frue v. Houghton,
6 Colo. 318; Fressler's App., 75 Pa. 483; Calanchini v. Bran-
stetter, 84 Cal. 249. Many courts hold that the filing of a bill for
specific performance is sufficient to make the remedy mutual.
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Cummins v. Beavers, supra; Ives v. Hazard, 4 R. I. 25; Estes v.
Furlong, 59 Ill. 298; Maghlin v. Perry, 35 Md. 352.
The modern idea of options was given in Watts v. Kellar. 56
Fed. i, where the court said: "An option to buy or sell land,
more than any other form of contract, contemplates a specific
performance of its terms; and it is the right to have them en-
forced specifically that imparts to them their usefulness and
value. An option to buy or sell a town lot may be valuable when
the party can have the contract specifically enforced, but if he can-
not do this and must resort to an action at law for damages, his
option in most cases will be of little or no value. No man of any
experience in the law would esteem an option on a law suit for an
uncertain measure of damages of any value."
It appears, therefore, after a review of the authorities, that the
courts will specifically enforce a transfer of title to property
where an option, given for a valuable consideration, is accepted
within the time specified for its life.
Has an option holder such control of the title that, because
he is entitled to specific performance, he may make a sale of the
land to a third person? This was the question asked and
answered in the affirmative by the Kansas Supreme Court in the
case under discussion.
Where the option has been given for a valuable consideration,
and therefore is irrevocable within 'the time limited, it may be
assigned. "Why may not an option to purchase be sold? If
the owner of an estate has fairly made a contract for a suffi-
cient consideration received by him, by which contract he has
himself stipulated that another person may, at the option of the
latter, receive a conveyance upon the payment or tender of a
fixed sum within a given sum, what principle of equity is vio-
lated by making the owner comply with this contract?" Hall v.
Center, 4o Cal. 65. Assigning the option, when supported by a
valid consideration, is not a wagering contract. Hanna v. In-
gram, 93 Ala. 482. In the case of Dyer v. Duffy, 39 W. Va. 148,
the assignment of an option was held void where no consideration
was given to support the option. The court thought that where
a man relied on the honesty and solvency of another he should
not be compelled to rely on still a third.
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If the option forms part of a lease which is assigned, the
option goes with it and may be enforced by the assignee. The
agreement giving the option to purchase is more than a personal
covenant. It is a right in the lessee which he might transfer to
his vendee and be enforced at the latter's election. Napier v.
Darlington, 70 Pa. 64; Kerr v. Day, 14 Pa. 112; House v. Jack-
son, 24 Ore. 89. And in McCormick v. Stephany, 57 N. J. Eq.
257, the executrix of the option holder (the option being con-
tained in a lease) was allowed to elect to buy. However, where
there was simply an option-not connected with a lease, which
was good for one year, and the holder died before that time, his
heirs were not allowed to exercise it. Sutherland v. Perkins, 75
Ill. 338.
A further illustration of the option holder's control over the
land is found in cases where there is a valid option, and the one
making the offer sells the land to a third person with notice, be-
fore the option has expired. There the holder of the option
may file a bill against both for a conveyance of the land to him-
self. Barrett v. McAllister, 33 W. Va. 738. Peoples St. Ry. Co.
v. Spencer, 156 Pa. St. 85; Haughwout v. Murphy, 22 N. J. Eq.
531; Lazarus v. Heilman, ii Abb. (N. C.) 93. An option may
be transferred or mortgaged. Bank of Louisville v. Baumeister,
87 Ky. 6. And it has even been held that an option to purchase
contained in a lease, when exercised, is subject to the lien of a
judgment. Ely v. Beaumont, 5 Sergt. & R. (Pa.) 124.
The United States Supreme Court in Willard v. Tayloe, supra,
says that it is not the invariable practice to grant specific per-
formance where options have been exercised but is a matter of
discretion for the court. "But," it adds, "the discretion which
may be exercised in this class of cases is not an arbitrary or
capricious one, depending upon the mere pleasure of the court,
but one which is controlled by the established doctrines and
settled principles of equity." In none of the other cases here re-
feri ed to was this phase of the question discussed.
The decision in the present case was based primarily upon
Trust Co. v. McIntosh, 68 Kans. 452, which held that a man
having such an interest in land that he may compel a convey-
ance by specific performance, may properly make a contract in
his own name to convey. A contract giving an option to pur-
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chase land gives an interest in the land to the person who has
the option. London & Southwestern Ry. v. Gwinn, 20 Ch. Div.
562; Peoples St. Ry. Co. v. Spencer, supra.
Easton v. Montgomery, 90 Cal. 307, is in point with the pre-
sent case. In that case the court said: "It is not necessary,
however, that the vendor should be the absolute owner of the
property at the time he enters into the agreement of sale. An
equitable estate in the land, or a right to become the owner of the
land, is as much the subject of sale as the land itself; and when-
ever one is so situated with reference to a tract of land that he
can acquire the title thereto, either by the voluntary act of the
parties holding the title, or by proceedings at law or in equity,
he is in a position to make a valid agreement for the sale there-
of."
Dresel v. Jordan, io4 Mass. 407, is one of the leading cases
holding that the vendor need not have an absolute title. Says the
court: "* * * if the obligation of the contract be mutual,
and the seller is able in season to comply with its requirements
on his part, to make good the title which he has undertaken to
convey, we see no ground on which the purchaser ought to be
permitted to excuse himself from its acceptance."
Since the holder of an option, given for a valuable considera-
tion, which makes it irrevocable within the time specified, may
by proper acceptance, compel a specific performance of the title
to him, it would seem that he has a right to contract for the sale
of the land. Within a reasonable time he may comply with the
contract of sale, and therefore, such a sale would be valid. Surely
in this country where the real estate business is so uncertain and
where land values fluctuate so rapidly, it would work an injustice
to hold that no one could make a valid contract for the sale of
land until the absolute title is vested in him.
WATERS AND WATER-COURSES-OWNER'S RIGHTS TO PERCOLATING
WATER.
The New Jersey Court of Appeals in reversing the holding
of the Supreme Court of that state in the case of Meeker v.
City of East Orange, 70 Atl. 360, not only deviated from the rule
long adhered to in that state but also rejects the English rule as
to property rights in percolating underground waters.
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The plaintiff owned a farm in what is known as Canoe Brook
Valley which he used in his dairy business as pasture land for
his stock. Two brooks ran through the farm which also con-
tained a spring, the water of which was used for drinking pur-
poses. His cattle in the pasture had for years resorted to the
brooks for drinking water. The City of East Orange, under
the authority of a statute, acquired a tract of 68o acres situated
in Canoe Brook Valley, above the plaintiff's farm, and installed
thereon a water plant of 20 artesian wells. A few years prior to
the commencement of this action the city began to pump
from the wells and it had thus taken water, which, but for its
interception, would have reached the plaintiff's spring or stream.
No water other than percolating has been taken and in this action
the plaintiff seeks damages for the diversion of such water which
otherwise would have reached his spring and for the injury to
the land caused thereby.
The lower court held that a city has an absolute right to ap-
propriate all percolating waters found beneath the land owned by
it and to use the water for purposes entirely unconnected with
the beneficial use and enjoyment of that land, to the extent, in-
deed, of merchandising the water and supplying it to the inhabi-
tants of East Orange. The judgment was based on the theory
that the owner of land has an absolute right to all waters found
beneath the land and that the diversion from the plaintiff's land
was damnum absque injuria.
The subject involved in the case is one of comparatively recent
development in our law, the first time it was discussed being in
the case of Hammond v. Hall, 10 Sim. 552 (184o) ; but that case
was not directly on the point so that Chief Baron Pollock says:
"That the distinction between underground waters and those
which flow upon the surface was first made in England in Acton
v. Blundell, 12 M. & W. 324, decided in 1843. Dickinson v. Canal
Co., 7 Exch. at 300. Chief Justice Tindal in that case approved
and adopted the maxim of the Roman law that: "If one digging
on his, own land, in good faith and with no purpose of injuring
his neighbor. nevertheless drys up his well by diverting the under-
ground currents from it, there is no remedy."
The question was again considered in Dickinson v. Grand Junc-
tion Canal Co., 7 Exch. 282; Broadbent v. Ramsbotham, ii
Exch. 602; but the doctrine of Acton v. Blundell, supra, was not
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essentially modified. The point finally came up before the House
of Lords in the case of Chesemore v. Richards, 7 H. L. Cas. 349
(856), where it was held that the owner of the land has an
absolute ownership of the waters found under it and may do with
them as he pleases. This decision has been treated as- finally
settling the law for England on this question and has been fol-
lowed and approved in numerous subsequent English cases.
Thus it is seen that the doctrine of reasonable use does not
exist as to percolating waters in England, but Lord Wensleydale
in Chasemore v. Richards, supra, says: "That according to rea-
son and law it seems right to hold that a land owner ought to
exercise his right to use percolating waters in a reasonable man-
ner with as little injury to his neighbor's rights as may be." And
he suggests it is not reasonable to pump water from a well to
supply a municipal corporation at a distance.
In speaking of the English cases on this subject, Mr. Farnham
in his recent comprehensive work on Waters and Water Rights,
Vol. III, p. 2718, says: "When it is remembered that the first
English case dealing with percolating waters arose in 184o, and
that it was not decided that a land owner might exhaust the
water to furnish a municipal water supply until i86o, it-will be
at once seen that there was no common law on the subject when
the American states put the common law into statute and hence,
the opinions of the American courts as to what is the common
law on this subject are as good as the English. Therefore, in
any case the question can be decided upon its merits, giving to
the English cases the weight their reasoning entitles them to, but
without the necessity of regarding them as binding precedents."
Bearing this in mind let us look for a moment at the American
authorities on this subject.
The first case in this country in which the question of owner's
rights in percolating water was involved was that of Greenleaf v.
Francis, 18 Pick. (Mass.) 117, decided in 1836, seven years be-
fore Acton v. Blundell, supra, the leading English case. It was
there decided "that the owner of the soil may dig a well on any
part of his land which he desires. It is a lawful act and al-
though it may be prejudicial to the plaintiff it is damnum absque
injuria." This case, however, is not inconsistent with the doc-
trine of reasonable use. In the case of Frazier v. Brown, iz
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Ohio St. 294, the court says: "That in the absence of express
contract and positive legislation, as between proprietors of adjoin-
ing lands, the law recognizes no correlative rights in respect to
underground water percolating or filtering through the earth."
In Miller v. Black Rock, 99 Va. 747, it is held that "percolating
waters which have no known or defined course are said to form a
part of the realty with the absolute right of use and appropria-
tion by the owner of the land." Holding that the owner of the
land has an absolute right to the use of percolating waters, pro-
vided that he does not act maliciously, may be cited, the cases
of Taylor v. Welch, 6 Ore. 198; Metcalf v. Nelson, 8 S. D. 87;
Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. St. 528; Roath v. Driscoll, 20 Conn.
533; Delhi v. Youmans, 50 Barb., (N. Y.) 316; Emporia v. So-
den, 25 Kan. 588, and Washliurn on Easements, Sect. 353.
Summing up it may be stated as a general rule that the owner
of the soil may intercept and divert percolating waters without
incurring liability to owners of land in the neighborhood through
whose lands the water so diverted would have percolated, and
this is true notwithstanding the fact that the consequence of his
act in so diverting or intercepting the water would be to injure
or even render entirely worthless another's well, spring, or sur-
face water course. This is stating the rule positively and broadly
but such statement is upheld by the cases cited.
But the rule above stated has been subject to qualifications and
it is with these qualifications that we must now deal and see to
what extent the absolute ownership has been modified.
The Minnesota court qualified the rule at an early date by
holding that "a land owner has no right, except for the benefit
and improvement of his own premises, or for his beneficial use
to drain, collect, or divert percolating water thereon, where such
act will destroy or materially injure the spring of another, and
that he cannot divert such waters for the sole purpose of wasting
them." Stillwater Water Co. v. Farmers, 89 Minn. 58. The Wis-
consin court held contra to this in Huber v. Merkel, 117 Wis. 355
but Prof. Farnham in a note to 64 L. R. A. 236, says that "thi,
case is opposed to good morals, good sense, and all common laA
principles."
Then the New York courts have deviated from the formei
strict rule and in Smith v. Brooklyn, 18 Hun. (N. Y.) 340, the3
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held "that the owner of land cannot gather the water by pumps
that it may be carried to a distant place for use or sale in a case
where the inevitable result would be to destroy a spring upon the
land of an adjoining owner." This has been followed consis-
tently, and in Forbell v. New York, 164 N. Y. 522, acting on the
suggestion of Lord Wensleydale mentioned before, they held
"that to fit up wells with pumps of such pervasive and potential
power that from their base they tap the water stored in the plain-
tiff's land and in all the region thereabout and lead it to his own
land and by merchandising it prevent its return is, however rea-
sonable it may appear to the defendant and its customers, un-
reasonable as to the plaintiff and others whose lands are im-
paired." The California courts in Katz v. Walkinshaw, 141 Cal.
116, make substantially the same holding.
The Vermont court in Chatfield v. Wilson, 28 Vt. 49, held that
"the owner of land may make any use whatever of the percola-
ing waters no matter by what motive he is induced, and that the
presence of malice makes no difference." But this case stands
alone on this phase of the question, the overwhelming weight of
authority being contra. Greenleaf v. Francis, supra; Wheatley
v. Baugh, supra, and Roath v. Driscoll, supra.
The first case in which a doubt was expressed as to the sound-
ness of the reasoning of the English cases and the one in which
the doctrine of reasonable use was enunciated was that of Bas-
sett v. Salisbury, 43 N. H. 569, in which, after a long and well
reasoned argument, the conclusion was reached that "owners of
land are liable to the owners of adjoining lands for injuries done
by the obstruction of percolating water unless such obstruction
was caused by them in a reasonable use of their own privileges
and rights." This case was later affirmed in Swett v. Cutts, 50
N. H. 439.
The Massachusetts courts have turned from their strict con-
struction of the rule and have indicated, particularly in Hart v.
Jamica, 133 Mass. 488, that they follow and agree with the rea-
soning of the New Hampshire courts. In Cohen v. Canada Land
Co., 142 Cal. 437, the California court held, "that the owner of
land has a right to make only a reasonable use of the water perco-
lating therein for the benefit and enjoyment of his land ;" and in
Haldeman v. Bruckhart, 45 Pa. St. 514, the Pennsylvania court
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said that "the right to use the percolating waters cannot be 
ex-
ercised in an unreasonable, negligent, or malicious manner to the
injury of the land owners in the vicinity." The same doctrine
has been applied to an artesian basin in Minnesota, the court say-
ing that "the law of correlative rights applies to the use, by adjoin-
ing land owners, of waters drawn from an artesian basin and
such proprietors must so use their wells as not to unreasonably
injure their neighbors." Erickson v. Crookston Water Co., ioo
Minn. 481. The following cases sustaining or tending to sustain
this doctrine of reasonable use may be cited: Barclay v. Abra-
ham, 121 Iowa 619, 64 L. R. A. 236, and note; Reisert v. New
York, 174 N. Y. 196; Gognon v. French Lick, 163 Ind. 687;
Katz v. Walkinshaw, 141 Cal. 116, and Pence v. Carney, 58
W. Va. 296.
In lO American and English Decisions in Equity, 704, issued
in 1905, it is stated that "it may be said to be now the generally
accepted doctrine in the United States that the rights of the
owners of soil to percolating waters are limited to a use for
proper purposes connected with the natural enjoyment of their
property. According to the best considered cases the early doc-
trine must be limited so as to permit only a reasonable use of the
percolating waters underlying the land." And in a note to Katz
v. Walkinshaw, 64 L. R. A. 236, it is said: "The New Hamp-
shire doctrine is the only one which can be recognized. The
mere fact that the source and course of the water is unknown is.
no reason why the courts should refuse to apply to such waters
definite rules so far as it is possible to apply them, and in actual
practice the application of rules recognizing correlative rights and
confining each land owner to a reasonable use of the percolating
water is not difficult."
Can it be said in these days of powerful machinery and modern
appliances, where it is possible for one owner to deprive the
lands of the neighborhood of this underground water and thus
render the land practically worthless, that percolating waters
are wholly without the protection of the law, that they, like wild
animals, belong alone to him who first obtains possession of
them?
From the trend of modem decisions, from the justice of the
rule, and from the clear concise reasoning through which it ar-
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rives at its opinion, it would seem that the New Jersey court was
right in adopting the doctrine of reasonable use in percolating
water and rejecting that of absolute ownership.
RIGHT OF MINISTERIAL OFFICER TO QUESTION CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF A LAW IN MANDAMUS PROCEEDING.
In a recent case, State ex rel., University of Utah v. Condland
et al., State Board of Land Commissioners, reported in 1o4 Pac.
285, the Supreme Court of Utah decided that when an officer,
though acting ministerially, is directly responsible for his offi-
cial acts, he may attack a statute directing him to act, as uncon-
stitutional, and upon that ground justify his refusal in a manda-
mus proceeding. The point in consideration came up on an ap-
plication to the court by which the University of Utah prayed a
mandate against the State Board of Land Commissioners to com-
pel said board to comply with the provisions of a certain act.
The commissioners refusing to act, justified their non-compliance
by pleading the unconstitutionality of the law under which the
mandate was prayed.
The following cases support their contention: In Van Horn
v. State ex rel., Abbott, 46 Neb. 62, it was stated: "As the Con-
stitution is our fundamental law, an act of the legislature repug-
nant thereto is not only voidable but absolutely void and of no
effect whatever. The officers of the state are sworn to support
the Constitution, so where a supposed act of the legislature and
the Constitution conflict, the Constitution must be obeyed and the
statute disregarded. Ministerial officers are therefore not bound
to obey an unconstitutional statute, and the courts, sworn to sup-
port the Constitution, will not by mandamus compel them to do
so." Marbury v. Madison, I Cranch (U. S.) 137 (18o3), holds
that courts as well as other departments are bound by the Con-
stitution. Norman v. Kentucky Board of Examiners, 93 Ky.
537, held that "although an officer cannot rightfully refuse
obedience to a law if it be prima facie regular and valid, for it
would be against public policy for him to do so, yet a court will
not compel him to obey a law when it is unconstitutional and
void." In the opinion of one of the judges, it was said: "It is
not only a right but a duty of such a ministerial officer (auditor
in this case) to contest the constitutionality of the law." The last
opinion is supported by Smith v. Broderick, lO7 Cal. 644.
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The Utah decision, supra, is supported also by McDermott v.
Dinney, 6 N. D. 478; Denman v. Broderick, iii Cal. 96; Von
Schmidt v. Widber, 105 Cal. 151; Brandenstein v. Hoke, ioi Cal.
131; Hindman v. Boyd, 42 Wash. 17; School Directors v. City 
of
New Orleans, 42 La. Ann. 92. (This case, however, was over-
ruled and the opposite rule established in the later case of State
ex rel. New Orleans Canal . Banking Co. v. Heard, 47 La. Ann.
1679.)
There are many cases in which the defense of unconstitu-
tionality of law was made without any discussion as to the right
to make such defense. People ex rel. Dunkirk, W. & P. R. Co.
v. Batchellor, 53 N. Y. 128; Madison County Ct. v. People ex rel.
Toledo, W. & W. R. Co., 58 Ill. 456; Rankin v. Colgan, 92 Cal.
6o5; State ex rel. Charleston, C. & C. R. Co. v. Whitesides, 30
S. C. 579. The reasoning in the above cases is constructed on 
the
hypothesis that "an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers
no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it cre-
ates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as
though it had never been passed." Cooley on Constitutional
Limitations, 3; Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U. S. 422; County
Comm's v. Kansas City R. R., 4 Kan. App. 772. While the rea-
soning in the cases just reviewed is logical, the reasoning in the
opposing line of cases is equally logical and is more expedient.
"A court will not listen to an objection made to the constitu-
tionality of an act by a party whose rights it does not affect, and
who has, therefore, no interest in defeating it." Cooley's Consti-
tutional Limitations, 23 2. The opinion in Thoreson v. State
Board of Examiners, I9 Utah i8, states that to allow a minis-
terial officer who has no direct personal interest in the matter to
refuse to perform his duty on the ground that performance of
the act would violate the Constitution, would be deciding a con-
stitutional question affecting the rights of third persons at the
instance of such officer, who because his duties are merely ministe-
rial, and because he has no direct interest in the question, cannot
in any event be made responsible. Ordinarily, a ministerial officer
has no different interest from that of any other citizen in con-
stitutional questions, and therefore cannot revoke the same.
State ex rel. Morton v. Stevenson, I8 Neb. 421. A party will
not be heard to question the constitutionality of a statute unless
he shows that some right of his is impaired or prejudiced there-
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by. Red River Valley Nat'l Bank v. Craig, I8i U. S.
548; Mountfort v. Hall, i Mass. 443; State v. Smiley, 65 Kan.
240, 196 U. S. 447. To allow a ministerial officer to decide upon
the validity of a law would be subversive of the great
objects and purposes of government, for if one such officer
may assume infallibility, all like officers may do the same and an
end be put to civil government, one of whose cardinal principles
is subjection to the law. People ex rel. v. Solomon, 54 Ill. 39;
Smyth v. Titcomb, 31 Me. 273; Maxwell v. Burton, 2 Utah 595;
Waldron v. Lee, 5 Pickering 323; State ex rel. v. Buchanan, 24
W. Va. 363; People v. Collins, 7 Johns. 549; Corn. v. James, 135
Pa. St. 480. "It is not within the scope of the duties of a minis-
terial officer to pass upon the validity of laws, instructions or pro-
ceedings, prima facie valid, and requiring his action. His only
duty in such a case is obedience, and he cannot excuse himself by
undertaking to show the unconstitutionality or other invalidity of
the law, or the irregularity of the proceedings." Mechem on
Public Officers, Sect. 523.
The general rule in regard to evidence is that a court in pass-
ing upon the constitutionality of a statute must confine itself to
a consideration of those matters which appear upon the face of
the law and of those of which it can take judicial notice and
cannot consider evidence aliunde to show the invalidity of the
statute. Stevenson v. Colgan, 91 Cal. 649; State ex rel. Reed v.
Jones, 6 Wash. 452; People v. Durston, 119 N. Y. 569; Harvey
v. Foster, 1I8 Ind. 502; Pacific R. R. v. The Governor, 23 Mo.
353. Therefore, the law of evidence as well as sound reasoning,
together with the important consideration of expediency, sup-
ports the latter view.
From the various decisions it is evident that there is no theory
which will reconcile all the conflict. There is running through
the cases, however, a general proposition which would give a
reasonable and satisfactory rule upon the question if ultimately
adopted. That rule is: that statutes are generally presumed to
be valid, and ministerial officers must treat them as such until
their invalidity is established, but that if the nature of the office
is such as to require the officer to raise the question, or if his per-
sonal interest is such as to entitle him to do so, he may contest
the validity of the statute in a mandamus proceeding brought to
enforce it. In other cases he must perform his duty as the statute
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requires, and leave those whose rights are affected by it to take
steps to annul it.
Applying the rule deduced from the decisions to the case under
discussion we conclude that, though there is much support, the
weight of authority is against the proposition that a ministerial
officer has a right to question the constitutionality of a law in a
mandamus proceeding to compel him to act under such law.
DEATH AND SURVIVORSHIP-PRESUMPTIONS.
In the case of Walton & Co. v. Burchel, decided by the Su-
preme Court of Tennessee in 1907, but reported only recently in
121 Southern Reporter, 391, where a father and son were killed
by a premature explosion of dynamite, the court held that "in
the absence of evidence as to which died first, there is no pre-
sumption in favor of either; the presumption being that both died
at the same time ;" and affirmed the decision of the lower court
which charged the jury that "when the proof shows that two
persons are killed in a common sudden disaster, the presumption
is that they died simultaneously." Among the leading cases
cited by the court to back up this opinion are: Russell v. Hal-
lett, 23 Kan. 276; Newell v. Nichols, 75 N. Y. 78; Moehring v.
Mitchell, i Barb. Ch. (N. Y.) 264; Young Women's Christian
Home v. French, 187 U. S. 4O, all of which clearly follow the
common law rule that when two or more perish in the same dis-
aster, there is no presumption of law whatever upon the subject
and that the law will no more presume that alr died at the same
instant than it will presume that one survived the other.
The question then remains, in these cases of survivo'rship in a
common disaster, whether the presumption that all died simul-
taneously has the same effect and means the same as the com-
mon law rule which holds that there is no presumption. Some
courts seem to be careless in their expressions on this point.
Newell v. Nichols, supra.
Presumptions of law are rules which, in certain cases, either
forbid or dispense with any ulterior inquiry; Bouvier's Diction-
ary. But some presumptions of law are disputable and hold good
only until they are invalidated by proof, and it seems that this
proof cannot be overcome always by a bare preponderance of
evidence. The State v. Jones, 64 Iowa 349. While not regard-
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ing a presumption as evidence, nevertheless some courts hold it
has a certain amount of probative force. Barber's Appeal, 63
Conn. 393; Bradshaw v. The People, 153 II. 156.
It would seem then, that it would require more evidence, to
some degree at least, with the presumption in the case than with
the presumption out.
The question of survivorship is one of fact, to be decided in
each case by the jury without any rule of presumption; Robin-
son v. Gallier, Fed Cas. No. 11,951; and if the evidence does not
establish the survivorship of any one, the law will treat it as a
niatter incapable of being determined. Wing v. Angrave, 8 H.
L. Cases 182.
Although, with the exception of Louisana and California,
the civil law does not apply in this country, yet evidence as to
age, sex, and physical condition of the persons who perished, the
nature of the accident and the manner of death may all be taken
into consideration by the jury. Wigmore on Evidence, Sect.
2532. In the absence of any legal presumption it would seem
that the jury may consider any evidence, however slight, in de-
termining whether the parties died together or one survived the
other; Robinson v. Gallier, supra; and the finding or verdict that
one of the persons survived the other may thereby be warranted
as a question of fact, though there is no direct or positive evi-
dence upon the question. Ehle's Will, 73' Wis. 445; Stinde v.
Ridgway, 55 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 301.
So it seems that there is a difference whether the law presumes
that the parties died together or does not presume anything at
all, and therefore the Tennessee court was wrong in assuming
that there is no difference even though the effect in this particu-
lar case would probably have been the same.
CHANGE OF CONTRACT OF INSURANCE BY AMENDMENT OF BY-LAWS
OF A FRATERNAL MUTUAL BENEFIT ASSOCrATION.
By its recent decision in the case of Wright v. The Knights of
the Maccabees of the World, 42 N. Y. Law J. No. 56, the Court
of Appeals of New York has further extended a rule of law
laid down by it which seems to be peculiar to that state, and un-
supported by either the weight of opinion or the better reasoning
of other jurisdictions. The history of this case, which has been
COMMENTS
before the courts for several years, has been reported in 48 Misc.
Rep. 558; 1i9 App. Div. 914; 122 App. Div. 904; 128 App. Div.
883.
The plaintiff became a member of the above named "Mutual
Fraternal Benefit Association" in 1897. In his application for
membership he agreed that any laws of the association "now in
force or that may hereafter be adopted" should form the basis
of the contract and be made a part thereof. The certificate, or
policy, issued to the plaintiff, stated that at his death, one assess-
ment on the membership, not exceeding $i,ooo would be paid as
a benefit to the designated beneficiary. It appears that the laws
then in force fixed the assessment of the member at $1.4o per
month and provided that he should pay the same rate of assess-
ment thereafter as long as he remained continually in good stand-
ing. Seven years later, the laws were amended by increasing
the monthly assessment to be paid by the member from $1.4o to
$3.o0 per month, and provisions were also adopted which de-
creased his benefits beyond those specifically stated in the certi-
ficate -issued to him and in the by-laws in force at that time.
These related to certain exemptions from payment after reaching
the age of seventy years. When the plaintiff refused to pay the
increased rate, he was suspended by the defendant order, and
the suspension, if lawful, involved the forfeiture of his right to
participate in either the benefit fund or in the fraternal privileges
of his tent. Claiming that such suspension was in violation of
law, he brought action to secure his reinstatement as a member
in good standing, the restoration of his certificate of insurance,
and an injunction against the defendant restraining it from
changing the contract or the laws and assessment thereunder.
Although it was shown that the changes were desirable as a
matter of policy for the general welfare of the order and that the
increased rates were not excessive, it was held without dissent
that the general statement in plaintiff's application did not amount
to such a reservation of power in the association as would au-
thorize it subsequently, and against the will of the insured, to
amend its by-laws so as to increase the assessment or decrease
his benefit beyond the amount specifically stated in his certificate
and in the by-laws in force at that time, and that it cannot be
held necessary, as a matter of law, for a corporation to violate
its contract to preserve its existence.
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The courts have widely discussed the subject of amendments
to by-laws of associations and they have differed in the various
jurisdictions as to the extent that contracts with members may
be affected by amendments. It is generally agreed that such an
association has the power to alter and amend its by-laws, pro-
vided that the new by-laws adopted are reasonable and not con-
trary to law; or are not inconsistent with its charter or the pur-
pose and object of its creation, or do not deprive any member of
his vested rights or impair the obligation of his contract of mem-
bership, and provided that the amendments are adopted in the
mode legally prescribed. Marshall on Private Corps., Sect. 330.
But when it is a matter of determining whether a given by-law"
is reasonable or whether it interferes with a vested right, or
whether it impairs the original contract of membership, there is
difficulty in reconciling the decisions, and indeed, in some
cases, they cannot be reconciled-a fact which courts have recog-
nized and which Chief Justice Parker admits in Parish v. N. Y.
Produce Exchange, 169 N. Y. 46, in distinguishing his holding
from that of Pain v. Societ6 St. Jean Baptiste, 172 Mass. 319.
The question involved in the principal case, as stated by the
Court of Appeals, is, how far does the reservation, by a mutual
benefit association, of a general power to amend its by-laws, with-
out specifying in what respects, authorize it to amend them in all
particulars. Or in other words, it asks, can such an association
amend a specific clause under a general power?
That this is an important question in view of the vast number
of such certificates being issued by the numerous benefit orders,
no one can deny. And the fact that the great majority contain
the general reservation clause in very 6ften exactly the same
wording as in the principal case, adds even more to its serious-
ness.
The decision of the New York court that the general power is
not sufficient, is not out of harmony with its previous holdings,
although, as the Supreme Court judge who first tried this case,
remarked: "A careful reading will show that none of the New
York cases go quite to the length of holding that a member of a
fraternal benefit association has a vested right in having his
charges remain at a certain rate when it is necessary that the
assessments be increased in order that the association be kept
alive."
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The early leading case is Kent v. Quicksilver Mining Co., 78
N. Y. 159, decided in 1879, in which that court held that 
even
though a power to alter and amend had been reserved by its char-
ter, a corporation could not repeal a by-law so as to impair rights
which had been given and become vested by virtue of it. As in
the principal case, that court has held, through a considerable
line of decisions, that such alterations of the original terms are
not reasonable because they disturb vested rights; that the con-
tract consists only of the application, certificate and by-laws in
force at the time the certificate is issued, and that it could not be
within the contemplation of the parties, in making the contract,
at least in the absence of stipulations clearly specifying the sub-
jects to be affected, that one party should have the right to make
changes and thus have the other party completely at his mercy.
Nothing less than an explicit statement in the certificate itself
that the payments therein specified would be subject to modifica-
tions that would reduce the pecuniary yalue of the agreement to
the member. would operate as a defense for the association
against the charge of impairment of the contract obligations.
Beach v. Supreme Tent of K. of T. W., 177 N. Y. ioo; Ayres v.
Ancient Order of United Workmen, 188 N. Y. 28o; Englehardt
-,. Fifth Ward R. D. and Loan Association, 148 N. Y. 281;
Weiber v. Equitable Aid Union, 92 Hun. 277. Reasonable amend-
ment is limited to matters regulating the administration of the
order and its membership which do not destroy contract rights.
Weber v. Sup. T. of K. of T. M., 172 N. Y. 49
o .
The English rule is clearly opposed to the doctrine of the prin-
cipal case. In Sinith v. Galloway (1898), I Q. B. 71, where a
subsequent amendment affected a reduction of sick benefits to the
plaintiff member, the court held that such benefits were not in
the nature of a vested right to a fixed sum and where the original
contract had provided for an alteration of the by-laws by a gen-
eral power given to the association, the member was bound by
any amendment that might subsequently be made, "whatever the
extent of that alteration may be."
The United States Supreme Court has held to the same effect
in Korn v. Mutual Assurance Society, 6 Cranch (U. S.) 192.
This was a case where a mutual fire insurance company changed
its by-laws so as to increase the assessments on certain policy
holders under a reserved general power to amend. A very help-
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ful view was introduced in this decision. The court called atten-
tion to the essential difference between a mutual and an ordinary
insurance company. The members of the former stand in the
peculiar situation of being party to both sides, insurer and in-
sured, so that there is a twofold liability on each member. In
this suggestion of the Supreme Court, there is the only key to
reconciling many of the decisions which, rightly analyzed, really
turn on the distinction between an attempted amendment of the
by-laws affecting the promise to the certificate holder and an
amendment affecting his duties as a member of the insuring asso-
ciation bound to fulfill his part in providing means to maintain
the order on a sound business basis. Reynolds v. Royal Ar-
canum, 192 Mass. 150.
The New York courts have regarded this question from a
standpoint of protecting the individual member's rights. As the
Illinois court says in Grand Legion of Ill. v. Beaty, 224 Ill. 346:
"Seldom, if ever, has the insured or his beneficiary the advantage
of legal advice when the insured enters the contract. The terms
being entirely those of the insurer's own choosing, the contract
should be liberally construed in favor of the insured."
The ground upon which the opposite view is based, is well
stated in Sup. Lodge, K. of P. v. Knight, T-17 Ind. 489, where a
change made for the welfare of the order under a reserved gen-
eral power to amend, whereby the original benefits were de-
creased for the older men by the creation of new classes for the
younger men, was held not to constitute such a breach of con-
tract that any damages could be ascertained or given. If the
change is made in good faith, and the motive which influences
the change is an honest desire to promote the welfare of the so-
ciety, and the members are all given an opportunity to avail them-
selves of the change, no actionable wrong is done the members or
their beneficiaries. It is the duty of the society to protect the in-
terests of the many, rather than the few. Persons who become
members of such societies must take notice of this, and one per-
son cannot therefore demand that the welfare of the order be
sacrificed for his sole benefit. His right is not an unqualified
vested right, but on the contrary, it is qualified and limited to a
great degree. The contractual relation between the members is
to be determined by a consideration of the entire body of rules
governing the association and is not limited to those existing at
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the time of a member becoming such. The only right which vests
is the right to such sums as become due before the new by-law
is adopted. Bowie v. Grand Lodge, 99 Cal. 392; Lawson v.
Hewell, 1iS Cal. 613; Fugure v. Mutual Society of St. Joseph,
46 Vt. 362; Pain v. Societ6 of St. Jean Baptiste, supra.
The Alabama courts strengthen this view. In the leading Ala-
bama case, Sup. Commandery, K. of Golden Rule v. Ainsworth,
71 Ala. 436, that court says: "The mutuality of duty and equality
of rights which is the fundamental principle of such organiza-
tions, cannot well be preserved if the members stipulating for
benefits were not required to consent that they would be subject
to future as well as existing by-laws. Time and necessity will
develop, a necessity for change in the by-laws, and if the consent
were not required, there would be a class of members bound by
the changed laws and a class exempt from their operation. And
there is little room, if any, for the apprehension that advantage
will be taken by the governing body, of the assent of the mem-
ber to be bound and affected by subsequent laws, to impose upon
him unjust burdens." This opinion was upheld by the United
States Supreme Court in 19o4. in Wright v. Minn. Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 193 U S. 657, where the rule is laid down that there is
no vested right in a policy holder to have the original plan of
insurance continued, nor is there any impairment of the obliga-
tions of any contract the member had with the association when
the company changed from the assessment to the regular
premium paying basis under a status permitting this change.
The conclusion from these citations is that the rule of the prin-
cipal case, while in harmony with the New York rule, is not in
accord with the weight of opinion or with what seems to be the
wiser reasoning.
